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This paper deals with the development of a mathematical model for complex socio-
economical systems, where external actions play a key role. The aim of the paper is to
show the emergence of collective behaviors or macroscopic trends from individual based
interactions, where agents are identified by functional subsystems. The approach is based
on themethods of themathematical kinetic theory for active particles, which describes the
evolution of large systems of interacting entities which are carriers of specific functions: in
our specific application socio-political activities subjected to the influence of the media.
© 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
A new mathematical approach to modelling complex social-economical systems has been recently proposed in [1] as
a natural development of the mathematical kinetic theory for active particles [2], already applied in various fields of life
sciences, e.g. to model multicellular systems [3], and social behaviors of interacting individuals [4,5]. This mathematical
theory describes the evolution of the probability distribution over themicroscopic state, called activity, of several interacting
entities called active particles. The equation which models the evolution is derived by a conservation balance in the
elementary volume of the space of the microscopic states, where the inlet and outlet flows are determined by interactions
among active particles.
The above mathematical approach has been developed in [1] to model complex socio-economical systems, where
individual behaviors and interactions may play a significant role on the evolution of the system. Indeed, living systems
have the ability to think, and as a consequence, to react to external actions, without following rules constant over time.
A basic reference is the so called behavioral economics, where deterministic rules may be stochastically perturbed by
individuals behaviors, that not only show random fluctuations, butmay be substantiallymodified by external environments,
e.g. depressive or panic situations. Many attempts to explicate these phenomena can be found in [6–14], where different
models of opinion dynamics are described. Other references with a more socio-psychological approach can be found in [15,
16]. Moreover, the literature of the last five years, with works as [17–20], has developed opinion dynamics models, focused
to understand the role of extremists in the evolution of the system. These ideas were preliminarly presented in [21].
These classes of models are finalized to show the emergence of collective behaviors and macroscopic trends, as a conse-
quence of individual based interactions. In our approach, the entities which interact to determine the emerging equilibria
are functional subsystems: according to the mathematical theory developed in [1], the overall system is decomposed into
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Table 2.1
Competition for a secession under influence of media
Global nation
Region1 Region2 External action
Political parties Interest groups Political parties Interest groups Media
u > 0 – pro u < 0 – against u > 0 – pro u < 0 – against Action over u
functional subsystems that refer both to the functions expressed by the socio-economical system,which is the system under
consideration, and to the observation and representation scale used in the mathematical modelling process. Therefore each
sub-system is related to a specific socio-economical function, called activity. The time-evolution of the whole system is
modelled bymathematical differential equations that describe the evolution of the probability distribution over the activity
variable. This general mathematical framework is specifically modified in this present paper to model the phenomenon of
competition for a secession under the action of media. The analysis is focused on the critical analysis of different strategies
to obtain, from the competition, the desired output. Suitable simulations contribute to this investigation.
In detail, the contents of the paper are organized in five sections, which follow the above introduction.
Section 2 deals with a description of the complex socio-economical system under consideration: the competition for a
secession under the influence of external actions. Moreover, it is shown how it can be decomposed into several interacting
functional subsystems, each of them having the ability to express socio-economical functions and purposes.
Section 3 deals with the derivation of a specific mathematical model for the external action exerted by media. The
derivation needs to be developed taking into account the specificity of the role of media action. The model is then inserted
within the framework of Section 2.
Section 4 deals with the derivation of a specific model of competition for a secession. The derivation needs, as we shall
see, a detailed modelling of the interactions between functional subsystems and among them and the outer environment,
namely media. This section finally provides the derivation of a mathematical framework suitable to design specific models.
Section 5 develops simulations focused on analysing the predictive ability of the model with special attention to the role
of the external action. Specifically, it is shown how these actions, which are supposed to operate on limited time intervals
and have a fixed cost, can modify the output of the competition.
Section 6 critically analyzes some specific applications and provides an overview on research perspectives, and is also
focused on further developments of the mathematical model in view of optimization problems.
2. Phenomenological description of the system: Competition for a secession under influence of media
This section deals with the phenomenological description of the socio-economical system under consideration, taking
into account the fundamental role of external actions. We propose the same mathematical structure dealt with in [1],
focusing on the discrete case.
Before approaching the mathematical modelling details, some introduction is needed. The recent socio-economical
literature has shown an increasing interest in the development of models regarding complex political phenomena, as
seen in [22–24], even if from a theoretical different approach, which avoid the concept of complex social dynamics. Some
interesting references can be found in [25–27], where socio-political phenomena like dictatorships, terrorism and strategical
interactions among interests groups are modelled and discussed from a quantitative approach, which takes into account
dynamical interactions among agents.
Moreover, while the subject of media influence has been deeply treated in the modern socio-political literature, as
witnessed by [28–31], the present literature is lacking the discussion of socio-economical phenomena under the influence of
media, from a quantitative approach. The aim of this paper is to propose a first attempt to explain such a complex influence
using the theory developed in [1].
The system, which we refer to, is a nation which, as visualized in Table 2.1, is decomposed into two or more subsystems
identified by regional interest groups, which express, through specific actions taken by either their political parties or their
peculiar interest groups, their attitude towards a process of secession by expressing a function u, which takes negative or
positive values: when a certain subsystem is expressing a positive value of u, then it is pro-secession, when it is expressing
a negative value of u, then it is against it. The absolute value of umeasures the intensity of the function expressed. Another
element which plays an important role in the system is the so-called external action, played by media: in our system,
each interest group or party can be strongly affected by media, which can be viewed as an additional external functional
subsystem; this means that media is another very powerful element of the decomposition.
Bearing this decomposition inmind, the overall nation is viewed as a network of interacting functional sub-systems, each
of them corresponding to different interest groups and political parties. Their representation is based on the assumption that
each of themhas the ability to express a specific function, namely their attitude towards secession. Also the role of themedia
is initially modelled, considering it as a different kind of subsystem, which can exert an external action.
Let us consider a network of n interacting functional subsystems whose function is identified by the variable u, where
the value u = 0 separates the positive and negative valued functions expressed by each subsystem. In particular, the socio-
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economical variable is identified by
Iu = {u−p = −1, . . . , u0 = 0, . . . , up = 1},
where the description of the state of each subsystem is delivered by the discrete probability density
f ji = f ji (t) : [0, T ] × R → Rn+,
p∑
j=1
f ji (t) = 1, ∀ t ≥ 0, (1)
for i = 1, . . . , n and j = −p, . . . , p.
We now focus on systems inwhich the number n of subsystems is constant and the number of possible socio-economical
states isH: thismeans thatwe are not dealingwith destructive or aggregative events. Interactions are supposed to be binary.
The mathematical framework to describe microscopic interactions between two subsystems can be described by means
of two different functions:
• the encounter rate ηpqij , which depends on the interacting subsystems i and j and on the socio-economical states, p and q
respectively, of the interacting particles.
• the transition probability density Bpqij (h) = Bij(up, uq; uh), that describes the probability density that a candidate
particle with state up of the subsystem i falls into the state uh after the interaction with a field particle of the subsystem
jwith state uq.
The transition probability density function is such that:
∀i, j, ∀p, q :
H∑
h=1
B
pq
ij (h) = 1. (2)
When, as we are doing, we consider open systems, that interact also with the outer environment, we have to deal with
functional subsystems interacting with external agents identified with the subscript ` = 1, . . . ,m, wherem is constant.
The external agent ` has the ability to influence the socio-economical state u of the subsystem i, through a particular
action identified by the variable v. The analysis developed in what follows is based on the assumption that the action of the
outer agents can be modelled as follows:
νi`(t) g`(v), (3)
where νi` = νi`(t) is the intensity, that can depend on time, during which the agent ` acts on the subsystem i; and g`(v)
is the probability density associated to the variable v that characterizes the action of outer system, namely the probability
that this action takes place over system i.
Notice that each external agent is regarded as a specific functional sub-system with the ability to interact with the
functional sub-systems of the inner system. Both terms νi` and g` are supposed to be given functions of their arguments.
The mathematical framework to describe the microscopic interactions between a subsystem i and an external agent `
needs the following discrete interaction terms:
• The inner–outer encounter rateµi` that describes the rate of interactions between an external agent ` and a subsystem
i and does not depend on the socio-economical state of the interacting particles.
• The inner–outer transition probability density Gpqi` (h) = Gpqi` (vq, up; uh), that describes the probability density that a
candidate particle with state up of the subsystem i falls into the state uh after the interaction with a field particle of the
external agent `with state vq.
The interaction term Gpqi` (vq, up; uh) satisfies the following condition:
∀i, `, ∀p, q :
H∑
h=1
G
pq
i` (h) = 1. (4)
Technical calculations yield:
df hi
dt
=
n∑
j=1
(
H∑
p=1
H∑
q=1
η
pq
ij B
pq
ij (h)f
p
i f
q
j − f hi
H∑
q=1
η
pq
ij f
q
j
)
+
m∑
`=1
(
H∑
p=1
H∑
q=1
νi`µ
pq
i` G
pq
i` (h)g
q
` f
p
i − f hi
H∑
q=1
νi`µ
pq
i` g
q
`
)
. (5)
Eq. (5) can be regarded as the fundamental framework for the derivation of models as we shall see in the next section.
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3. Modelling external actions
While the reasonings of Section 2 are very general and they can be applied to many phenomena, now we want to define
the external action in a very specific case, namely the ‘‘competition for a secession’’ phenomenon under the influence of
media.
In these last centuries, the role of communications becomes more and more important: it is well known that social
and political events are strongly affected by media, this is the reason why a development of the model in [1] is necessary,
introducing this important external role. Before approaching the mathematical modelling part, some introduction is
required.
In real economicworld, any action has a cost. Thismeans that if mediawant to influence everyday phenomena, they have
to design specific strategies under their budget constraints. In particular, if television, radio and newspaper want to modify
the political life of a country, they have to do it, under specific budget limitations. Moreover, they have to choose which
kind of influence they want to exert and which kind of purpose they want to reach. From now on, we will call this behavior
a ‘‘strategy’’: once a specific purpose is designed, media have to choose a strategy to reach this purpose at their best. For
example, if the owner of a big newspaper wants to influence the population of a country pro or against secession, he or she
has to decide whether to invest his/her budget towards influencing political parties or to split the same budget among the
different interest groups in the country. In addition, we can think of media action to be decreasing in time. This means that
media influence lasts for just a certain window of time Ts, given a certain level of investment, and, after this period, expires,
so that interactions are the same as without it. Clearly, the bigger the investment, the longer the influence.
Notice that the mathematical derivation of this section refines the one described in the previous section, since we derive
the specific action of external agents, in the case of media.
The different external agents are denoted by the subscript `. The external agent’s influence is represented by
νi`(t) = εi`ai(t). (6)
The action of media is considered certain, therefore we do not take into account any probabilistic influence of media
towards subsystems: if subsystems encounter media action they will be affected anyway. The action of the external agent
is affecting the different level of subsystem opinions, identified by u.
Every external agent ` can influence the subsystem i, with an intensity εi`: this is the action over the state of the opinion
up. This means that by media actions, the opinion distribution of the subsystem i can change. ai(t), instead, represents the
duration of such an influence and it is just an action over time.
Following the previous introduction, the level of intensity expressed by the external agents `, is subjected to a budget
constraint:∑
i,`
εi`
∫ Ts
0
ai(s)ds = Ctot, (7)
where Ctot represents the maximum cost the media owner can sustain, for the time interval Ts. Notice that the cost Ctot
corresponds to the level of investment the media owner must afford to influence opinions during a time period Ts. For
t > Ts : ai(t) = 0. The total cost can be normalized so that Ctot = 1.
Notice that the action in time is exerted in the interval [0, Ts], which can, from a mathematical point of view, be
normalized to [0, 1]. Nevertheless, in the next section we are going to investigate the role of Ts in the general applied
phenomenon, even when it exceeds the unitary value.
The purpose of the external agent, given a fixed budget, consists in finding the best repartition of intensities to influence
opinions, in order to choose which opinions the efforts have to be concentrated on. In particular, εi` is constant in time and
varies with u, namely the intensity of the action is distributed over different opinions, according to the different strategy
chosen. It is possible to use all the intensity to influence opinion uh or, instead, to use the same intensity divided by n over
all the opinions u1, . . . , un.
ai(t) represents the duration of the influence and it can assume different forms: it can be a function constant over time,
or a function decreasing in time, depending on which kind of influence we want to model.
In the next section we will focus on the case in which ai is such that
∫ Ts
0 ai(s)ds = Ts, referring to a case of interest for the
applications. In this case we just have to focus on the values of εih.
4. On the competition model and strategy
Let us now consider the modelling of a competition for a secession, referred to a system corresponding, in this specific
problem, to a nation subjected to the media action: i. e. a nation where broadcasting television companies are free to
operate. We assume u to be a discrete variable, since it better represents the different level of opinions, related to each
group (subsystem). The domain interval [−1, 1] is defined as follows
Iu = {u1 = −1, u2 = −0.5, u3 = 0, u4 = 0.5, u5 = 1} (8)
representing H different level of opinions.
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Let us assume that the nation is divided into a richer and a poorer region, so that the richer part hopes to benefit from
a secession in terms of national income and taxes. For simplicity, we suppose that there is just a single television network,
owned by someone living in the richer region, wanting to manipulate the global information in order to favor secession.
Many cases of everyday reality in which information manipulation seems to deeply influence the political scenario of a
country can be figured. Differently oriented political parties and interest groups interact in the global nation in order to
support the secession or not and they have to deal with media information. The specific model proposed in what follows
is characterized by a small number of variables and very simple interaction functions. The aim is to show that, even in a
simple case, the model can describe some interesting phenomena. Following the approach proposed in [1], the first step of
themodelling consists in identifying the functional subsystems that compose the overall system. Accordingly, let us suppose
to decompose the system into the following subsystems:
• Political parties,
• Unions,
• White collars,
• Broadcasting TV company exerting an external action.
Let us focus on the above four subsystems to define a simple model suitable to describe the evolution of the system
using a small number of parameters. Bearing in mind that each subsystem can be anyway represented in a much more
complex way, considering the different orientation (left, right and center) that are present in political parties, unions and
white collars, and the varieties of influence which a television system can exert, we define the following discrete probability
densities, regarding the three internal subsystem, since we suppose the action of media to be certain:
• f h1 (t), describes the distribution over the state of the subsystem political parties,• f h2 (t), describes the distribution over the state of the subsystem unions,• f h3 (t), describes the distribution over the state of the subsystemwhite collars.
The second step consists in modelling the interaction terms, namely the matrix of the encounter rates ηij among unions,
white collars and political parties, the matrix of the inner–outer encounter rates µi`, among subsystems and media, the
parameters of the transition probability density and the intensities regarding the external action of TV εi`. Notice that ` = 1,
since we just deal with a single external agent.
Let us deal with the modelling of the encounter rate ηij according to the following assumption:
Hp. 1. ηij = ηji does not depend on the state of the interacting subsystems, but only on the interacting pairs.
In particular we suppose that ηij attains the largest valuewhen the interactions takes placeswithin the same subsystems:
η11 = η22 = η33 = η0 = 1,while η12 = η21 = α1 < η0, η13 = η31 = α2 < α1η0, η23 = η32 = α3η0,where α2 < α3 < α1.
The values of ηij are reported in the following matrix:( 1 α1 α2
α1 1 α3
α2 α3 1
)
. (9)
Referring to the inner–outer encounter rate µi`, we simply assume that the citizens of the country watch TV uniformly,
independently from their social status: µi` = γ , for i = 1, 2, 3.
Let us now model the discrete transition probability density function. The modelling is developed according to the
following assumption consistent with the approach proposed in the previous section.
The discrete probability density function,Bpqij (h) = Bij(up, uq; uh), represents the probability density that a particle with
state up of the population i falls in the state uh, after the encounter with a particle with state uq of the population j. We look
for a discrete function such that
∀i, j, ∀p, q :
5∑
h=1
B
pq
ij (h) = 1. (10)
Let us introduce a critical distance dc , such that, if encounters take place between individuals, whose opinions are closer
than dc , then the two parties get nearer according to their opinions (dialectic case); if encounters take place between
individuals, whose opinions are more distant than dc , then the two parties get farther according to their opinions (non
dialectic case). This means that the model can become either dialectic or non dialectic depending on the distance in state
of the interacting subsystems: if dc is big enough the parties can reach an agreement while if dc is not, there is a conflict
solution. Notice that it is possible to define more than a single critical distance dc , so that there are many intervals in the
real line in which the model is dialectic and others in which it is not.
We can define the discrete transition probability density function as follows. If p = q ⇒ Bpqij (h = p) = 1,Bpqij (h 6= p)= 0. If p 6= q, | p− q |≤ dc , the model is dialectic, namely, if p < q one has
B
pq
ij (h = p+ 1) = β, Bpqij (h = p) = 1− β, Bpqij (h 6= p, p+ 1) = 0;
if p > q:
B
pq
ij (h = p− 1) = β, Bpqij (h = p) = 1− β, Bpqij (h 6= p, p− 1) = 0.
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If p 6= q, | p− q |≥ dc , the model is non dialectic, namely, if p < q
B
pq
ij (h = p− 1) = β, Bpqij (h = p) = 1− β, Bpqij (h 6= p, p− 1) = 0;
if p > q
B
pq
ij (h = p+ 1) = β, Bpqij (h = p) = 1− β, Bpqij (h 6= p, p+ 1) = 0,
where β > 1/2.
Let us nowmodel the external action over the inner subsystem i. According to (6), the influence ofmedia ` over subsystem
i can be thought as νi` = εi`ai(t), where εi`(u) represents the intensity of the action and ai(t) its the duration. For simplicity,
we assume that for all i one has:
ai(t) =
{
1 if t < Ts,
0 if t ≥ Ts. (11)
This means that the action of TV is constant in time for a duration Ts, depending on the level of investment. The
mathematical modelling of the intensities εi` is more complicated and it is related to the concept of strategy. As we stated
in the previous paragraph, we assume
Ts
3∑
i=1
5∑
p=1
εi`(p→ h) = Ctot,
where εi`(p→ h) represents the external action which transforms opinion p into the new opinion h.
We consider Ctot fixed. Moreover, we consider the case in which the media action concentrates in order to influence
citizens pro secession. There are many explanations about it such as,a media owner is in favor of separation since he lives in
the richer region or he thinks he could benefit from the separation, reducing the TV market and so on. . . . According to this
scenario the TV owner can chose different strategies to reach his purpose: we will investigate three of them.
Let us imagine that opinion 1 is the radical opinion against secession, opinion 5 the radical one towards secession and the
other opinions the moderate ones, pro or against it. We can model the budget constraint assuming that TV shifts opinions
for a maximum of 4 hops for every subsystems: this means that TV owner can decide whether to influence just individuals
with opinion 1 towards opinion 5 or to influence individuals of every opinion, just shifting them to one single opinion. In
both cases the total number of hops that TV generates is 4, since we assume that people with opinion 5 cannotmove further.
Bearing this in mind, we define the three different strategies to investigate in the next section. Notice that the aim of
the investigation is to explore different possible strategies in order to understand and compare them, referring to the final
outcome. Simulation are to be conceived in this sense.
• Strategy 1: TV concentrates all its efforts upon opinion 1:when individualswith opinion 1 encountermedia, they radically
change their mind and become individuals of opinion 5,
• Strategy 2: TV concentrates its efforts upon central opinions 2 and 3: when individuals with opinions 2 and 3 encounter
TV, they respectively go towards opinion 4 and 5,
• Strategy 3: TV concentrates its efforts upon every opinion: when individuals with opinion p encounter TV, they
respectively go towards opinion p+ 1, except for individuals with opinion 5 who do not change opinion.
More in details we define the external action for the three strategies as follows for i = 1, 2, 3:
• Strategy 1: εi`(up) = u5 if p = 1 and εi`(up) = 0 if p 6= 1;
• Strategy 2: εi`(u2) = u4 and εi`(u3) = u5, εi`(up) = 0 if p 6= 2, 3;
• Strategy 3: εi`(up) = up+1, ∀p = 1, 2, 3, 4, εi`(up) = 0 if p = 5.
Taking into account the previous definitions, it is possible to obtain the following 3× 5 systems of ordinary differential
equations:
df hi
dt
=
3∑
j=1
(
5∑
p=1
5∑
q=1
ηijB
pq
ij (h)f
p
i f
q
j − f hi
5∑
q=1
ηijf
q
j
)
+ ai(t)
(
5∑
p=1
εi`(p→ h)µi`f pi − f hi εi`(h→ p)µi`
)
, (12)
where i = 1, 2, 3 and h = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, εi`(p→ h) represents the external action over f pi which transforms opinion p into
opinion h and εi`(h→ p) the external action over f hi which transforms opinion h into a different opinion.
5. Simulations
This section develops an analysis finalized to the selection of the optimal strategy, based on simulations which refer to
each strategy.
These simulation are obtained by solving the initial value problems generated by model (12) linked to suitable initial
conditions.
716 G. Ajmone Marsan / Computers and Mathematics with Applications 57 (2009) 710–728
In particular, referring to the model described in the previous section, simulations are developed to obtain the time
evolution of the three subsystems under consideration, respectively political parties, unions andwhite collars. The following
parameters representing the encounter rate and the transition probability density: α1 = 0.75, α3 = 0.45, α2 = 0.25,
µ1 = µ2 = µ3 = 1 and β = 1, are adopted, while the interval of opinions, spanning in the interval [0, 1], is discretised
into 5 different levels, representing the 5 different opinions which can be assumed within each subsystem.
Keeping all these parameters fixed, the goal of the simulations is to investigate the role of the two fundamental
parameters of the system: the critical distance dc and themedia time action Ts, in the evolution of f1, f2 and f3, given random
uniformly distributed initial conditions. Simulations are developed in the case in which the two extreme opinions are free
to move between opinion 0 and opinion 1. All the figures reported hereby are such that
• opinion 1 corresponds to continuous line
• opinion 2 corresponds to dashed line
• opinion 3 corresponds to thick line
• opinion 4 corresponds to dot-dashed line
• opinion 5 corresponds to very thick line.
Each strategy is analysed singularly. Subsequently a comparison among them is developed.
5.1. Strategy 1
Media implement strategy 1 when all actions are concentrated upon opinion 1, which is directly shifted to opinion 5.
Even in this very preliminary case, results are very different from the case of no media action.
When dc = 0, 1 and Ts < 3, the action of media has no influence in the evolution and results are similar to the ones
in [1]: we can see that for t < Ts opinion 1 is decreasing, then it is possible to notice an angle point for t = Ts, and, for
t > Ts, opinion 1 increases its value towards the equilibrium, as reported in Figs. 1–3. This means that for low value of Ts
media cannot influence people’s opinion: whenmedia action takes place, namely for t < Ts, opinion 1 is decreasing its value
because of media strategy. For t > Ts, instead, media action is expired and opinion 1 inverts its trend, starting to increase
its values. For Ts = 3, 4 a transition emerges: opinion 1 has a much smaller intensity at equilibrium than for Ts < 3; for
Ts ≥ 5 the transition takes place, namely opinion 1 survives with very little intensity, while opinion 5 has significant values,
as shown in Figs. 4–6. Notice that, starting from this very preliminary case, results are much different from those reported
in [1], where for dc = 0, 1 opinion 1 and 5 were surviving with almost the same intensity.
When dc = 2, we observe a slow convergence and the so-called compromise solution emerges. When Ts < 10, opinion
5 can survive together with opinion 4 or opinion 4 can survive together with opinion 3, depending on initial conditions. For
values of Ts near 10 convergence is still slow and, in particular, much slower than in the nomedia case. The trend is however
evident: opinion 4 and 5 survive sometimes together sometimes alone, depending on initial conditions. More rarely there is
the survivance of opinion 4 with opinion 3. Notice that, again, this is much different from the case with no media: if dc = 2
people are less extreme than when dc = 0, 1 but are more right oriented than in [1]; thanks to media action the population
is anyway shifted towards opinion 5 or close opinions, namely opinion 4, which can be considered as a ‘‘moderate extreme
opinion’’. The moderate equilibrium behavior is clearly due to dc . See Figs. 7–12.
For dc = 3, 4, even for small values of Ts, opinion 2 never survives, just opinion 3 and 4 survive, depending on initial
conditions. Again the trend is to have a population shifted towards 5, as shown in Figs. 13–15.
To summarize, Ts is a key parameter for low values of dc : dc still plays a fundamental role since it measures the tendency
of people to be extreme; anyway the media influence is remarkable, since, for suitable values of Ts, all the population is
shifted towards the opinion desired by media. In particular, we can see from figures that, when media action takes place,
opinion 1 is always decreasing, for t > Ts it can raise a little, but the trend is however established. If people tend to be
extremists (low values of dc) just opinion 5 survive, while if people tend to agree (high values of dc) the surviving opinion is
mainly opinion 4: strong evidence of media influence.
5.2. Strategy 2
Strategy 2 concentrates upon two different opinions, opinion 2 and opinion 3, shifting them respectively into opinion
4 and 5. In this case, for dc = 0, 1 the parameter Ts has no influence in the evolution of the three densities: opinions 1
and 5 survive as in the case with no media action, the unique difference is that opinion 1 is rarely the dominant one, see
Figs. 16–18.
For dc = 2, solutions are very similar to the one for dc = 0, 1, except for the survivance of opinion 4 for a certain window
of time and for the increasing value of opinion 5, which is higher than before. Again Ts has no influence, see Figs. 19–21.
When dc = 3, the transition has taken place: opinion 3 and 4 survive even for Ts = 1 and opinion 4 is generally more
influent that opinion 3. Notice that for t = Ts there is an angle point which shows that for t < Ts opinion 3 is decreasing due
to media action and for t > Ts it starts increasing, since media action is expired. When Ts = 2 opinion 4 begins to appear
with opinion 5. This phenomenon is more evident for Ts > 3. Notice that this is much different from the no media case.
When dc = 4 the phenomenon is the same as before, just more evident: for Ts = 1 opinion 3 and 4 survive, then for Ts = 2
just opinion 4 survives and for Ts ≥ 3 opinion 4 survives together with opinion 5. See Figs. 22–24.
G. Ajmone Marsan / Computers and Mathematics with Applications 57 (2009) 710–728 717
Fig. 1. Strategy 1 — evolution of the components of f1 in the case of dc = 0, 1, Ts = 2.
Fig. 2. Strategy 1 — evolution of the components of f2 in the case of dc = 0, 1, Ts = 2.
Fig. 3. Strategy 1 — evolution of the components of f3 in the case of dc = 0, 1, Ts = 2.
Fig. 4. Strategy 1 — evolution of the components of f1 in the case of dc = 0, 1, Ts = 5.
Even in this case the differences between the case with nomedia are absolutely evident. Opinion 3 almost never survives
and all the population is shifted towards opinion 5 depending on the critical distance dc . In particular, it seems that for low
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Fig. 5. Strategy 1 — evolution of the components of f2 in the case of dc = 0, 1, Ts = 5.
Fig. 6. Strategy 1 — evolution of the components of f3 in the case of dc = 0, 1, Ts = 5.
Fig. 7. Strategy 1 — evolution of the components of f1 in the case of dc = 2, Ts = 5.
Fig. 8. Strategy 1 — evolution of the components of f2 in the case of dc = 2, Ts = 5.
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Fig. 9. Strategy 1 — evolution of the components of f3 in the case of dc = 2, Ts = 5.
Fig. 10. Strategy 1 — evolution of the components of f1 in the case of dc = 2, Ts = 15.
Fig. 11. Strategy 1 — evolution of the components of f2 in the case of dc = 2, Ts = 15.
Fig. 12. Strategy 1 — evolution of the components of f3 in the case of dc = 2, Ts = 15.
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Fig. 13. Strategy 1 — evolution of the components of f1 in the case of dc = 3, 4, Ts = 5.
Fig. 14. Strategy 1 — evolution of the components of f2 in the case of dc = 3, 4, Ts = 5.
Fig. 15. Strategy 1 — evolution of the components of f3 in the case of dc = 3, 4, Ts = 5.
values of dc , namely dc = 0, 1, 2 this strategy is not very efficient since opinion 1 is still surviving. While for dc = 3, 4 the
strategy is really efficient, since, for a sufficient time exposition to media action, almost all the population is captured by
opinion 5 or 4. This is reasonable since, in this case, the strategy acts on intermediate opinions, that are the ones which play
an important role when dc is high, if instead dc is low, intermediate opinion tend to be attracted by extreme ones and the
strategy has no power.
5.3. Strategy 3
Strategy 3 is such that opinion 1, 2, 3, 4 go respectively to opinion 2, 3, 4, 5 and opinion 5 remains the same. This strategy
is the most uniform one in the sense that all the opinions are affected by media action.
When dc = 0, 1, opinions 1 and 5 survive even if opinion 5 is much more intense. In this case media action response is
highly evident and progressive, depending on Ts: the more Ts, the more opinion 5 has influence and opinion 1 decreases, as
shown in Figs. 25–30.
When dc = 2 the scenario is different: for Ts ≤ 4, opinion 5 is very influent, even if surviving with opinion 1 and 4 for
small values of t . For Ts ≥ 4, opinion 5 is the unique to survive with a certain intensity. See Figs. 31–36.
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Fig. 16. Strategy 2 — evolution of the components of f1 in the case of dc = 0, 1, Ts = 4.
Fig. 17. Strategy 2 — evolution of the components of f2 in the case of dc = 0, 1, Ts = 4.
Fig. 18. Strategy 2 — evolution of the components of f3 in the case of dc = 0, 1, Ts = 4.
Fig. 19. Strategy 2 — evolution of the components of f1 in the case of dc = 2, Ts = 1.
When dc = 3, the surviving opinions are 3 and 4 or 4 and 5 depending on initial condition, for Ts = 1. When Ts = 2,
opinion 3 is no longer surviving and, for Ts ≥ 6, opinion 5 is the unique to survive. If dc = 4 results are almost the same
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Fig. 20. Strategy 2 — evolution of the components of f2 in the case of dc = 2, Ts = 1.
Fig. 21. Strategy 2 — evolution of the components of f3 in the case of dc = 2, Ts = 1.
Fig. 22. Strategy 2 — evolution of the components of f1 in the case of dc = 3, 4, Ts = 10.
Fig. 23. Strategy 2 — evolution of the components of f2 in the case of dc = 3, 4, Ts = 10.
but just for Ts ≥ 4 opinion 5 is the one which survives, with almost intensity 1, this means that almost all the population is
influenced. See Figs. 37–42.
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Fig. 24. Strategy 2 — evolution of the components of f3 in the case of dc = 3, 4, Ts = 10.
Fig. 25. Strategy 3 — evolution of the components of f1 in the case of dc = 0, 1, Ts = 5.
Fig. 26. Strategy 3 — evolution of the components of f2 in the case of dc = 0, 1, Ts = 5.
This strategy is very efficient, especially for dc = 3, 4, even with a low value of Ts; however, it is possible to see a very
good dependence frommedia action even for dc = 0, 1, 2.With a sufficient value of Ts the goal ofmedia is definitely reached,
since almost all the population is captured by the desired media opinion.
6. Analysis of strategies and perspectives
A comparison among the various simulations is finally developedwith the aim of focusing on the emerging events, due to
the action ofmedia. First of all it is remarkably evident that all the three strategies significantly influence opinions dynamics:
results in all the three cases are very different from the ones found in [1]. Moreover, the interesting issue is that all the three
strategies are different from the other in their results, even reaching the common aim.
As far as strategy 1 is concerned, we notice that Ts plays an important role for low values of dc , while, regarding strategy
2, Ts plays an important role for high values of dc : this is explained by the fact that strategy 1 is very efficient in those
cases in which extreme opinions are fundamental in the dynamics, while strategy 2 is efficient in those cases in which the
intermediate opinions are important to determine the evolution. This means that these two strategy can be more or less
efficient depending on the degree of radicalization of the initial population: if the population is not inclined to compromise,
strategy 1 is better, while if it is, strategy 2 works well.
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Fig. 27. Strategy 3 — evolution of the components of f3 in the case of dc = 0, 1, Ts = 5.
Fig. 28. Strategy 3 — evolution of the components of f1 in the case of dc = 0, 1, Ts = 20.
Fig. 29. Strategy 3 — evolution of the components of f2 in the case of dc = 0, 1, Ts = 20.
Fig. 30. Strategy 3 — evolution of the components of f3 in the case of dc = 0, 1, Ts = 20.
Anyway the most efficient results are obtained with strategy 3. In this case the dependence on Ts is strongly evident and,
no matter which is dc , there is always a time Ts, which guarantees to influence all the population towards opinion 5. This is
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Fig. 31. Strategy 3 — evolution of the components of f1 in the case of dc = 2, Ts = 1.
Fig. 32. Strategy 3 — evolution of the components of f2 in the case of dc = 2, Ts = 1.
Fig. 33. Strategy 3 — evolution of the components of f3 in the case of dc = 2, Ts = 1.
Fig. 34. Strategy 3 — evolution of the components of f1 in the case of dc = 2, Ts = 5.
evenmore evident for high values of dc , when the dynamic is more free, since, due to people’s interaction, all the population
can be easily oriented to the direction settled by media. This is definitely the most efficient strategy.
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Fig. 35. Strategy 3 — evolution of the components of f2 in the case of dc = 2, Ts = 5.
Fig. 36. Strategy 3 — evolution of the components of f3 in the case of dc = 2, Ts = 5.
Fig. 37. Strategy 3 — evolution of the components of f1 in the case of dc = 3, 4, Ts = 1.
Fig. 38. Strategy 3 — evolution of the components of f2 in the case of dc = 3, 4, Ts = 1.
Summarizing, it seems, from simulations, that concentrating upon all opinions always leads to a winning outcome, while
the choice to influence not all the opinions can lead to a favorable equilibrium, depending on the initial predisposition of
the population.
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Fig. 39. Strategy 3 — evolution of the components of f3 in the case of dc = 3, 4, Ts = 1.
Fig. 40. Strategy 3 — evolution of the components of f1 in the case of dc = 3, 4, Ts = 7.
Fig. 41. Strategy 3 — evolution of the components of f2 in the case of dc = 3, 4, Ts = 7.
Fig. 42. Strategy 3 — evolution of the components of f3 in the case of dc = 3, 4, Ts = 7.
This paper has developed a detailed modelling and analysis of the competition for a secession phenomenon under the
influence of media. The modelling is based on the approach proposed in [1], where two ingredients play an essential role
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in the modelling process. Namely the decomposition of the overall system into functional subsystems and the use of the
approach of the kinetic theory for active particles. The modellings new contribution, with respect to [1] is the detailed
description of external actions and, subsequently, the identification of specific strategies, which are supposed to satisfy the
external action purposes. The identification of the optimal strategy is simply obtained by selecting, at fixed cost, the strategy
that assures the most desired asymptotic behavior.
The contribution of this paper should be considered essentially methodological assuming that the approach can be
technically generalized to different systems, such as those introduced in [1]. On the other hand, although the optimization
problem can be put in a suitable analysis framework, the heuristic solution obtained by simulations appears to be useful and
effective, since, even for a very preliminary model, they show peculiar emerging outcomes, which can be seen as the first
attempt of further applied research developments.
Therefore, rather than focusing on research perspectives on analytic mathematical problems, it is worth stressing
the utility of refining modelling aspects. Specifically, the assessment of the appropriate decomposition into functional
subsystems and the identification of the strategies applied by the media.
Moreover, it is worth remembering that the model proposed hereby is a very preliminary attempt to formalize one of
the most significant and important phenomena of our century. To investigate the topic further, it is absolutely necessary to
develop a model where the media are more than one, expressing contrasting purposes and strategies at the same time. In
this case it would be interesting to see which strategy is predominant and which is dependent on initial conditions.
Indeed, improving the above two issues definitely leads to improve the result of the optimization, keeping in mind that
the methodological approach still remains the essential background for further developments and analysis.
To conclude, it is worth to remark that, the goal and the innovative aspect of this model is not only to give a detailed
quantitative description of the phenomenon, while showing the emergence of a clear collective behavior, as a consequence
of the interaction among functional subsystems and media.
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